Abstract: In the process of fact-finding, although the forensic practice and theoretical research have reached a consensus on the stance of getting rid of the shackles of “scientific determinism” regarding the regulation of acceptance of expert opinions with strong professionalism and technology, they have not changed from the existing opinions after breaking away from the appraisal opinions. The method of interpretation is systematically constructed from the source material of the law. Judicial proof in the context of scientific evidence, based on the standpoint of respecting science and preventing judges from losing their evidence, it is not appropriate to make incompatible argumentative reasoning between scientific methods and legal methods. In a specific type of litigation where judges cannot absolutely monopolize the power of fact-finding, it is not appropriate to easily abandon the expert opinion and replace it with technical method of law. Only when the evidence is unqualified or the judge chooses a lower standard for the degree of proof of the expert opinion within the range of probability, it is appropriate to obtain interpretation and filling tools from legal methods.

Key words: litigation for new plant variety rights, appraisal opinions, scientific evidence, proof standards, probative force

摘要： 事实认定过程中，对于专业性和科技性较强的鉴定意见采信的规制，尽管司法实践和理论研究对摆脱“科学决定论”束缚之立场达成共识，但并未在脱离鉴定意见后从现有的法源材料中系统地建构解释方法。科学证据语境下的司法证明，基于尊重科学和防止法官心证失据之立场，科学方法与法学方法之间不宜作不相容的选言推理。在法官无法绝对垄断事实认定权限的特定诉讼类型中，不宜轻易舍弃鉴定意见而代之以法的技术性方法。仅当证据失其适格或法官对鉴定意见的证明度在盖然性的幅度范围内选择较低的标准时，才宜从法学方法上获致解释与填补工具。

关键词: 植物新品种权诉讼, 鉴定意见, 科学证据, 证明标准, 证明力